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NOTES
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp.: A Further Step Toward a
Complete Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Test
Jurisdiction of the American courts under the Sherman Act' has
been extended to certain activities which take place outside of the
United States.2 Such an extension is required by the inclusion of a for-
eign commerce provision in the antitrust laws that states that restraints
of trade or attempts to monopolize "among the several states, or with
foreign nations"3 are violations of U.S. law.
The exact reach of the Sherman Act to activities that take place
within foreign nations or that involve foreign law is not clear. United
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
2 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter
referred to as Alcoa].
Jurisdiction is usually absolute over activities that occur within a sovereign's boundaries.
This notion of territorial jurisdiction is ingrained in American law. See The Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). The corollary to this notion is that a nation normally does not
have jurisdiction over activities outside its boundaries. But see note 4 infra. There are, however,
three generally accepted exceptions to the general rule of territorial jurisdiction. The first excep-
tion is the nationality principle which allows a state jurisdiction to prescribe rules for its nationals
wherever they may be found. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE
UNrrED STATES § 30 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. The second exception, referred
to as the protective principle, permits a state to exercise jurisdiction over activities that threaten
the state's security or governmental operations, no matter where they occur or whom performs
them. Id. at § 33. The third exception, sometimes referred to as the universality principle, allows
a state to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over piracy and other crimes of universal interest.
Id. at § 34 & § 34, Reporter's Note 2. For a further discussion of these bases of jurisdiction, see J.
RAHt, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST- OVERLAP AND CONFLICTS 392-402
(1970).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976) (emphasis supplied).
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States courts, however, generally have taken jurisdiction over foreign
activities only when those activities affect U.S. foreign commerce.4 A
single standard for determining the degree of the effects necessary
before American courts will acknowledge jurisdiction never has been
clearly articulated. Several standards have emerged. Jurisdiction has
been asserted when the activities were "intended to affect imports and
exports. .. [and] is shown actually to have had some effect of them."5
Jurisdiction has been asserted even when "the combination affected the
foreign commerce of this country"6 without any indication of the de-
gree of effects needed or the necessity of an intent to affect it. On the
other hand, some courts assert jurisdiction over foreign acts and con-
tracts which have "a substantial and material effect upon our foreign
and domestic commerce."7
4 The classic statement of this extraterritorial reach of jurisdiction was made in Alcoa, 148
F.2d at 443. In this case, Judge Learned Hand decleared that "it is settled law.. that any state
may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends .. " Id.
The Alcoa court based jurisdiction on effects that occurred within the United States, although
the challenged activities took place outside the United States. The effects doctrine has been
adopted by the Restatement:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that
occurs outside its territory or causes an effect within its territory, if either
a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort
under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule applies;
(ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result
of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of
justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 18.
It has been suggested by some commentators that effects on U.S. foreign commerce are not
always necessary to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act. Professor James
Rahl advocates this notion: "I offer the following formula, however, as an attempt to state the
scope of the statute as to foreign activities: . . . the Act reaches a restraint or monopolization
either (1) if it occurs in the course of foreign commerce, or (2) if it substantially affects either
foreign or interstate commerce." Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the American Antitrust
Laws, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523 (1974). See also J. RAHI, supra note 2, at 50-89; Ongman, "Be
No Longer a Chaos Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's ExtraterritorialJuri-
diction, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 733, 741-743 (1977).
For a good compilation of cases and the different formulas describing the type of effects
needed to support jurisdiction, see Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under
the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 199, 206-219 (1977).
5 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 445 (emphasis supplied).
6 Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917). This case did point, however, to the fact that
while the foreign activities affected U.S. foreign commerce, the combination "was put into opera-
tion" in the United States. Id.
7 United States v Watchmakers of Switz. Info. Center, Inc., [1963] TRADE CAs. 77,457
(CCH) (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The Department of Justice's view of what type of conduct falls within
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act is: "When foreign transactions have a substan-
tial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, they are subject to U.S. law regardless of where they
take place." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL
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Whatever the degree of effects required for the assertion of Sher-
man Act jurisdiction in the context of United States foreign commerce,
three exceptions to its exercise have arisen even when the effects on
such commerce are substantial enough to support a Sherman Act viola-
tion.' The first and most prevalent exception is the act of state doctrine
which precludes American courts from inquiring into the validity of the
acts that a recognized foreign sovereign performs within its own terri-
tory. This doctrine has been part of American law since 1897 when the
Supreme Court decided Underhill v. Hernandez.9 The second excep-
tion, which closely parallels the act of state doctrine, is the foreign com-
pulsion doctrine. Under this exception, if a foreign sovereign compels
a party to act in violation of the Sherman Act, such compulsion is a
valid defense to an antitrust suit. This exception was first enunciated in
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc. 1o in which the
court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that
the defendant oil companies had a complete defense to the plaintiffs
antitrust charge since they had been compelled by Venezuelan regula-
tory authorities to engage in a boycott designed to deny the plaintiff
Venezuelan crude oil.
A third exception to the exercise of jurisdiction in a situation in-
volving substantial effects on U.S. commerce was introduced in 1976 in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.11 In that case, the notion
of international comity was thrust into the jurisdictional equation. The
Timberlane court decided that effects on U.S. commerce should not be
the only basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction: "An effect on United
States commerce, although necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction
under the antitrust laws, is alone not a sufficient basis on which to de-
termine whether American authority should be asserted in a given case
as a matter of international comity and fairness." 12 This case requires
American courts to balance the American interests in preventing harm
to United States commerce against possible conflicts with foreign soy-
OPERATIONS (rev. ed. Mar. 1, 1977), reprintedin [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 799 at E-6 and [1977] 2 TRADE Ro. REP. (CCH) No. 266, at 6. The Antitrust Guide was a
cooperative effort between the Justice Department and representatives of the President's Export
Council. It was designed to provide information about the Department of Justice's likely enforce-
ment action in various factual situations that raise antitrust questions as they occur in ordinary
business transactions.
8 The first trio exceptions are well-established in American law; the third is relatively new.
See notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text infra.
9 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
10 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
11 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
12 Id at 613.
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ereigns if American authority is asserted. After weighing the factors
present in a given situation, a court may decide to refrain from exercis-
ing its jurisdiction.13
Questions concerning the act of state doctrine and the role of com-
ity in antitrust subject matter jurisdiction determinations were central
issues in the recent Third Circuit case of Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp.'4 In Mannington, defendant Congoleum Corp., an
American company, used patents that it owned in foreign countries to
exclude plaintiff Mannington Mills, Inc., also an American company,
from those foreign markets. Mannington Mills claimed that Con-
goleum's foreign patents had been obtained through fraudulent repre-
sentations to foreign sovereigns and therefore breached American
standards. Thus, Mannington Mills claimed, Congoleum should not be
able to use these patents in order to restrain U.S. foreign commerce. In
bringing the suit, Mannington was anticipating that the court would
extend the holding of Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machin-
ery Corp. 1' to foreign patents. In Walker Process, a similar claim was
successful with respect to domestic patents. The central questions that
evolved in Mannington were whether the court possessed subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim and whether jurisdiction should be
exercised if it was present.
The Mannington court answered these central questions as follows.
First, the court decided that it did possess subject matter jurisdiction
over the claim. The court then explained why the act of state doctrine
did not apply under the facts of the case. Finally, in an extension of the
Timberlane holding, the court decided that it may properly abstain
13 Id at 614-15. This note will argue that the comity factors may result in the determination
that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 87-89 infra.
14 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
15 382 U.S. 172 (1965). In Walker Process, the Supreme Court decided that a patentee's at-
tempted enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud from the U.S. Patent Office may result in
liability against the patentee under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id at 176-77. The fraud and the facts
relating to monopolization, of course, would have to be proved at trial. Id at 178. Mannington
wanted the court to extend this reasoning to apply to holders of foreign patents.
In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), the Supreme Court affirmatively an-
swered the question whether a "United States District Court has jurisdiction to award relief to an
American corporation against acts of trade-mark infringement and unfair competition consum-
mated in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States." Id. at 281. The plain-
tiff, Bulova, had brought suit under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1050-1127 (1976), against
Steele for manufacturing watches in Mexico under the name Bulova. Steele interposed as a de-
fense his due registration in Mexico on the mark Bulova. 344 U.S. at 282. By the time the case
reached the Supreme Court, however, Mexico's courts had nullified the defendant's registration of
Bulova. This difference is crucial from the Manninglon facts. The Steele Court concluded: "The
question, therefore, whether a valid foreign registration would affect either the power to enjoin or
the propriety of its exercise is not before us." 344 U.S. at 289.
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from jurisdiction if principles of comity so dictate. The case was re-
manded to the district court in order to make this determination.
After summarizing the facts and opinion of the case in greater de-
tail and providing the reader with some background of the act of state
doctrine, this note will analyze the act of state and comity issues in
Mannington. Two conclusions follow from this analysis. First, by ac-
curately analyzing the act of state doctrine as it has developed in the
courts, the Manning/on court correctly decided that Mannington's
cause of action did indeed circumvent the act of state doctrine. This
decision, in turn, reveals certain inadequacies of the doctrine. These
inadequacies lead to the second conclusion: A single balancing test
which includes comity factors should be formulated for a subject mat-
ter jurisdiction determination. Such a test would place the effects upon
U.S. commerce on one side of the balance and foreign interests in the
activity on the other side. The court then would have to decide which
interests outweigh the others in a given case. Jurisdiction thus would
depend on a sliding scale of effects on U.S. commerce-the greater the
foreign interests involved, the greater must be the effects on commerce
for the courts to take jurisdiction. This approach differs from the one
mandated by the court in Mannington, which directed the court to first
determine whether jurisdiction exists by analyzing the effects that the
challenged activity has on commerce and then determine whether the
court should abstain from exercising such jurisdiction based on comity
factors.
THE MA.NNINGTON DECISION
Congoleum Corp. owns patents in the United States 6 and twenty-
seven foreign countries 7 relating to the process in the manufacture of
chemically embossed vinyl floor covering. In litigation involving essen-
tially the same facts but setting forth different legal theories, the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey held that Manning-
ton Mills, Inc., an American company engaged in the manufacture of
floor coverings, did not hold a license to use Congoleum's foreign pat-
16 The validity of these patents was sustained in Congoleum Industries'Inc. v. 4rnstrong Cork
Co., 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1975), aft'g, 339 F. Supp. 1036 (E. D. Pa. 1972) and 366 F. Supp. 220
(E.D. Pa. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975).
17 The countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, India, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, the Phillipines, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, and Venezuela. Brief for Appellant at 6, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Industries, Inc., 595 F.2d 1291 (3d Cir. 1979).
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ents.' 8 Mannington then commenced an action 19 against Congoleum
claiming that Congoleum violated the Sherman Act by procuring for-
eign patents through fraudulent misrepresentations to foreign patent
offices and undertaking actual and threatened enforcement of these for-
eign patents for the purpose of monopolizing and restraining the export
trade of the United States in the chemically embossed vinyl flooring
market.20
In an unreported decision of the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey,2' the court granted defendant Congoleum's
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.22 Mannington promptly appealed the decision
and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district
court's dismissal of the Sherman Act claim and remanded the case.23
The Court of Appeals opinion may be divided into three sections
for purposes of analysis. In the first section, the court concluded that
an American court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claim as-
serted by Mannington. 24 The court decided that since Mannington al-
leged conduct on the part of defendant that ultimately resulted in harm
to plaintiff's export business, subject matter jurisdiction did exist under
18 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Industries, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 145 (D.N.J. 1977).
Mannington Mills received a license to use such patents in 1968, but the license was revoked by
Congoleum Industries (predecessor in interest to Congoleum Corp.) effective January 31, 1975.
The court in this case upheld the revocation.
19 After the district court found for Congoleum on the license claim of Mannington, a consent
order was vacated thus allowing Congoleum to enforce its foreign patents in foreign courts. While
the motion to vacate the order was before the district court, Mannington sought leave to file an
amended complaint setting forth the Sherman Act claims. Leave was granted except for one
claim, which was subsequently brought under a separate suit and which forms the basis of the case
under study in this note. As to the claims in the other case, the district court granted summary
judgment for Congoleum on August 31, 1978, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed part of this judgment on August 1, 1979.
20 Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1291
(3d Cir. 1979).
21 The decision was rendered in an oral opinion on April 24, 1978, and an order was signed on
May 1, 1978, dismissing the complaint.
22 FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6). The court also dismissed, with prejudice for failure to state a
claim, Mannington's allegation that Congoleum breached private obligations under the Paris
Convention and the Pan-American Convention. Mannington's claim that Congoleum's actions
constituted unfair competition under the common law of the state of New Jersey was dismissed
without prejudice for want of pendent jurisdiction. These claims will not be discussed in this note.
23 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). The circuit court
affirmed the district court's decision with respect to Mannington's treaty claim, but vacated the
district court's decision with respect to New Jersey's unfair competition common law cause of
action.
24 The court also noted that in personam jurisdiction is present over both parties. 595 F 2d at
1291.
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the Sherman Act.25
In the second part of the decision, the court explained why neither
the act of state doctrine nor the defense of foreign sovereign compul-
sion barred the adjudication of Mannington's claims. The act of state
doctrine was defined by the court as "a policy of judicial abstention
from inquiring into the validity of an act by a foreign government. 2 6
The defense of foreign sovereign compulsion was noted as "similar in
effect but somewhat conceptually distinct"27 from the act of state doc-
trine. The court rejected both doctrines stating: "We are unable to ac-
cept the proposition that the mere issuance of patents by a foreign
power constitutes either an act of state, as that term has developed
under case law, or an example of governments' compulsion."2 " The
court left no doubt as to its view that the granting of patents was not the
type of sovereign activity for which the act of state doctrine had been
developed to protect. "[Tihe granting of the patents per se, in substance
ministerial activity, is not the kind of governmental action contem-
plated by the act of state doctrine or its correlative, foreign compul-
sion.""
Having disposed of the first two possible exceptions to the exercise
of jurisdiction, the court turned to the area of comity in the third sec-
tion of its decision. Under the heading "Comity, Abstention, and In-
ternational Repercussions," the court discussed the question of whether
the jurisdiction, although vested, should be exercised.30 The plaintiff
contended that since Congoleum's foreign patents had been obtained
from the foreign countries by conduct unacceptable by American stan-
dards, 31 antitrust liability should be extended to defendants.32 This
would be true despite the fact that the patent was valid under the laws
of the foreign nations. By pursuing this line of argument, Mannington
avoided asking the American court to declare the foreign patents inva-
lid under the issuing countries' laws.
Realizing that a judgment against Congoleum would have effects
25 The court implicity assumed that the effects on the export trade were substantial: "It can no
longer be doubted that practices of an American citizen abroad having a substantial effect on
American foreign commerce are subject to the Sherman Act. . . . Therefore, we are satisfied that
the district court did have jurisdiction in this case." 595 F.2d at 1292.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1293.
28 Id. at 1293-94.
29 Id. at 1294 (emphasis supplied).
30 Id.
31 This is a contention plaintiff would have to prove at a trial on the merits if Walker Process
is followed. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
32 See note 15 supra.
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abroad,33 the court decided that a balancing test, weighing the compet-
ing interests of the U.S. and other countries, should be undertaken
before jurisdiction is exercised. In determining which factors should be
considered in the balancing test, the court turned to the decision in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank ofAmerica3
4 and gleaned ten factors35
to be evaluated before jurisdiction is exercised. These factors, several
of which involve difficult judgments as to the importance of the con-
duct involved to the countries concerned and the possible effects on
U.S. foreign relations, have to be evaluated with respect to each of the
countries in which Congoleum holds a patent. With this said, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the case to the district
court for further proceedings.
A concurring opinion was filed by Judge Adams which differed
from the majority in three major respects. First, the concurring judge
believed that the Walker Process rationale is applicable to the procure-
ment of foreign patents.36 Second, the concurring judge thought that a
court cannot decide that it has subject matter jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act and yet refrain from its exercise because of international
comity considerations. Judge Adams stated: "[I]t seems that those con-
siderations are properly to be weighed at the outset when the court de-
termines whether jurisdiction vel non exists, or in fashioning the
decree. ' ' 37 Finally, the concurring opinion concluded that jurisdiction
should be exercised in the present case and possible international reper-
33 The court noted that a 'judgment against Congoleum in this country would have direct and
ripple effects abroad." 595 F.2d at 1296.
34 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). Timberlane involved an antitrust action brought against the
Bank of America for allegedly conspiring with its Honduran subsidiaries to restrain plaintiff from
milling lumber in Honduras and exporting it to the United States.
35 The factors the court enumerated are as follows:
(I) Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) Nationality of the parties;
(3) Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that abroad,
(4) Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
(5) Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
(6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief;
(7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both coun-
tries;
(8) Whether the court can make its order effective;
(9) Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign
nation under similar circumstances;
(10) Whether a treaty will be the affected nations has addressed the issue.
595 F.2d at 1297-98. Many of these factors are in turn derived from § 40 of the Restatement, note
2 supra.
36 595 F.2d at 1299.
37 Id.
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cussions should be dealt with only in formulating a remedy.3"
Judge Adams' insistence that jurisdiction should be exercised in
this case essentially stems from the notion that Congoleum was not
compelled to violate American law even though Congoleum was obey-
ing the laws of a foreign nation. Judge Adams believes that interna-
tional comity becomes significant only when foreign law requires
conduct inconsistent with the Sherman Act.39 He therefore would re-
mand the case to the district court in order to allow Mannington to try
to prove that, as required by Walker Process, Congoleum procured the
foreign patents through fraud and that such conduct resulted in mo-
nopolization of a relevant market of the United States foreign trade.40
A BRIEF LOOK AT THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
In order to understand whether the act of state doctrine was cor-
rectly rejected as inapplicable to plaintiff's cause of action in Manning-
ton, it is first necessary to understand some of the history, bases, and
development of the doctrine in American law. The act of state doctrine
was first enunciated over eighty years ago in Underhill v. Hernandez.
41
In that case, the plaintiff sued the commander of a revolutionary army
in Venezuela for damages resulting from the commander's refusal to
grant the plaintiff a passport, the plaintiffs forced confinement to his
home, and the harassment that the plaintiff received from soldiers in
the revolutionary army. The revolutionary army later became part of
the legitimate government of Venezuela recognized by the United
States. In refusing to allow the plaintiff a recovery, Chief Justice Fuller
announced what has become the classic formulation of the act of state
doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
42
Although the act of state doctrine began with Underhill, much of
the present understanding of the doctrine and its basis in American law
stems from the decision in Banco Naciona? de Cuba v. Sabbatino.43 In
38 Id at 1302.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1303.
41 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
42 Id. at 252.
43 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In Sabbatino, the defendant, an American commodity broker, had
contracted to purchase sugar from a Cuban corporation whose main owners were Americans.
Before the shipment of the sugar, Cuba expropriated the sugar company's property. A ship carry-
ing the sugar was allowed to leave Cuba only after the defendant executed a contract, similar to
the one entered into with the corporation, with an arm of the Cuban government. The plaintiff,
Northwestern Journal of
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that case, the Supreme Court held that the act of state doctrine is not
compelled "either by the inherent nature of sovereign authority [or]
.. . by some principle of international law."44 Sabbatino nevertheless
raised the act of state doctrine to nearly constitutional dimensions.
While the doctrine is not required by the United States Constitution,
according to the Sabbatino Court, it does have "'constitutional' under-
pinnings. 45
Sabbatino concluded that the basis for the act of state doctrine that
gives rise to its constitution-like status is the American system of gov-
ernment which mandates the separation of powers. The doctrine is
designed to help preserve the proper sphere of action of each branch of
government and insure that actions of one branch are not unduly hin-
dered by another branch of the government. The act of state doctrine's
"continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper dis-
tinction of functions between the judicial and political branches of the
Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs."46 The judiciary
generally should not pass on the validity of foreign states' acts for this
may hinder the executive branch in carrying on foreign relations and
conflicts between the branches should be avoided whenever possible. It
should be noted, however, that the Court was careful to point out that
the doctrine does not "irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capac-
ity to review the validity of foreign acts of state."'47
who was the assignee of the second contract, instituted this suit to recover the proceeds of the bill
of lading. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that
the Cuban expropriation decree violated international law, and this decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court reversed this judgment.
44 Id. at 421. The idea that the act of state doctrine is not generally accepted in international
law also is stated in the Restatement: "International law does not generally require a state to give
effect to the law of another state, and the law established the act of state doctrine as an exception
to this general rule." RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 41, comment (a).
45 376 U.S. at 423.
46 Id. at 427-28.
47 Id. at 423 (emphasis supplied). One reaction to the Sabbatino case was the passage of the
Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
This statute prohibits the interposition of the act of state doctrine to suits such as Sabbatino, which
involve foreign sovereign acts that are contrary to international law. The statute states in relevant
part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline on the
ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect
to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title or other rights to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such
state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by
an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law, including the principles
of compensation and the other standards set out in this subsection.
22 U.S.C § 2370(e)(2) (1976).
The act of state doctrine also may not apply if the executive branch has clearly indicated that
it has no objection to the examination by a court of the validity of the act of a foreign state
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.
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A recent Second Circuit case extended the coverage of the act of
state doctrine in order to preclude a cause of action which would re-
quire the American court to examine the motivation behind a foreign
sovereign's acts even though the validity of the act itself is not directly
challenged. In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. ,48 an independent oil producer
brought an antitrust action against the Seven Sisters, the seven major
oil companies, 49 for allegedly encouraging the Libyan government to
nationalize plaintiff's Libyan oil concession. Hunt maintained, how-
ever, that he was not challenging the validity of the nationalization but
was instead suing defendants for their role in the nationalization. 0
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the claim was
non-justiciable, reasoning that judging the motivation behind the act
could not be separated from judging the validity of the act. Antitrust
liability therefore could not be attributed to the defendants unless the
plaintiff could prove that butfor their combination or conspiracy Libya
would not have moved against it. Thus, the court refused to separate
Libya's motivation from the validity of its seizure and defendant's ac-
tions were shielded by the involvement of the foreign sovereign.51
Hunt also serves to illustrate that the act of state doctrine is appli-
cable to antitrust suits. The first application of the doctrine to antitrust
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-Schappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1954).
48 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1978).
49 These are: Mobil, Exxon, Shell, Texaco, Standard of California, British Petroleum, and
Gulf.
50 Neither the Libyan government nor any Libyan officials were made defendants to the ac-
tion.
51 550 F.2d at 77. One complicating factor in the case was that previously the U.S government
had officially characterized the motivation of the Libyan government in the expropriation as an
aggressive act designed as a political reprisal against the United States. It would then be even
more difficult for the court to find that Libya had acted solely at the instigation of the defendants.
For the view that Hunt is an unwarranted extension of the act of state doctrine, see Note, The
Pitfalls of 4ct of State 4naolsis in the .4ntitrust Context: 4 Critique ofHunt v. Mobil Oil, 6 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & Por'y 749 (1977).
In OccidentalPetroleum Corp. v Buttes Gas and Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (D.C. Cal. 1971), af'd
per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972), the act of state doc-
trine was interposed to bar the plaintiffs claim that the defendant had induced a foreign sover-
eign, the Ruler of Shariah, to claim ownership of, and thus interfere with, the plaintiffs oil
concession.
A different line of reasoning may be seen in IndustrialInvestment Development Corp. v. Mitsui
& Co., Ltd, 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979). In that case, a Sherman Act cause of action was brought
which alleged that the defendants had damaged the plaintiffs by causing the cancellation of a
Forestry Agreement which led to the Indonesian government denial of a timber cutting license.
Despite the involvement of the Indonesian government in plaintiffs damages through the denial
of the license, the act of state doctrine was rejected in the case because "neither the validity of
those [timber] regulations nor the legality of the behavior of the Indonesian government [in deny-
ing the license] is in question here." 594 F.2d at 49.
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suits occurred, however, seventy years earlier in American Banana Co. v
United Fruit Co. 52 In that case, plaintiff argued that the American de-
fendant, a New Jersey corporation, had monopolized and restrained
trade by allegedly instigating the Costa Rican government to interfere
with the operation of plaintiff's banana plantation in Costa Rica. The
Supreme Court held that the defendants' acts were legal under the ju-
risdiction where they occurred and were not to be judged by American
standards. The Court stated:
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place
where he did the acts not only would be unjust, but would be an interfer-
ence with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.5 3
Much of the American Banana holding, however, has been undercut by
later developments. For example, the notion that jurisdiction depends
solely upon the location of the actor has not been preserved especially
in the realm of the antitrust laws. 4 Despite this erosion, the act of state
doctrine continues to be applied to antitrust claims.5
THE M,4NNINGTON APPROACH TO JURISDICTION
At first glance, it would appear that any suit involving a foreign
patent would fall within the ambit of the act of state doctrine since the
act of granting a patent by its nature, always involves the act of a for-
eign sovereign. Such a generalization, however, is inappropriate. The
involvement of a foreign sovereign in an activity, though a necessary
condition, is not alone sufficient to bring an action within the act of
state doctrine. Additional inquiries are necessary before the doctrine
will be applied by a court to shield a party from antitrust liability.
These additional inquiries in the area of granting a patent may
begin with a simple question. Does the granting of a patent conform to
52 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
53 Id. at 356.
54 See note 4 supra.
55 The act of state doctrine may bar adjudication of an antitrust cause of action even when
effects on the U.S. are demonstrated; Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), is one
example.
One final note should be added to this brief examination of the act of state doctrine. Not all
foreign acts of states are protected by the act of state doctrine from an inquiry by the American
courts. In 41fred Dunhill ofLondon, Inc., v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), the Court
declined to apply the doctrine in a case involving Cuba's refusal to return payments mistakenly
made by Dunhill's for cigars purchased before the Cuban expropriation of the cigar business.
Four justices of the Court were in favor, however, of separating public from commercial acts of
state and applying the doctrine only to the former. Whether commercial acts of state will remain
outside the act of state's coverage remains to be seen.
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the characteristics of acts of a foreign sovereign which traditionally
have been held to fall within the act of state doctrine? The Manningon
court said no. The granting of a patent was "in substance ministerial
activity."56 Such a statement dismisses the possible importance of the
grant of a patent to a particular issuing country. Granting of a patent
essentially can be viewed as granting a monopoly to a private party.
The ease or difficulty with which one obtains a patent in a given coun-
try may well refelct that country's policy of promoting industry or eco-
nomic growth. This may be especially true if the issuing country
attaches conditions to a patent, such as a requirement that the patent be
actively worked. While Mannington stressed that it was not asking to
have the foreign patents declared invalid, it should be noted that the
effect of the requested remedy is nearly the same, at least with regard to
American companies, since an unenforceable patent is of little value to
an American company.
Despite the rather loose characterization of the importance of pat-
ents, the court still may be correct in its rejection of the act of state
doctrine in this case. The involvement of a foreign sovereign is one's
activities is not always enough to shield such actions from antitrust lia-
bility in the United States. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank. of
America,"7 the plaintiffs brought an antitrust action against the Bank of
America for allegedly interfering with plaintiff's lumber operations in
Honduras. The plaintiff alleged that the Bank of America was the
force behind frivolous suits, instituted against it in the Honduran
courts, that placed an "embargo" on the plaintiff's property.58 The
plaintiff alleged that the court officer appointed to oversee its property
was on the payroll of the Bank of America. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the act of state doctrine did not protect the
defendant's actions despite the fact Honduran officials and the Hondu-
ran court were involved in some of the activity. In Timberlane, the
court held that "mere governmental approval or foreign governmental
involvement which the defendants had arranged does not necessarily
provide a defense."59 The fact that a foreign government may be in-
volved, in some way, in a private party's conduct is a necessary but not
sufficient condition to trigger the act of state doctrine. The court stated
that "[i]t is apparent that the doctrine does not bestow a blank-check
immunity upon all conduct blessed with some imprimatur of a foreign
56 595 F.2d at 1294.
57 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
58 The suit against Timberlane was brought by one of its creditors, on a claim assigned by the
Bank of America, despite Timberlane's willingness to settle the claim out of court.
59 549 F.2d at 606.
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government. 6 °
Mannington takes the "imprimatur" argument to its logical end.
Obtaining a patent essentially involves obtaining the approval of the
issuing country to have the privilege of being free from competition in
a certain limited field of endeavor. The private party initiates the gov-
ernment action.6' Congoleum was not forced to obtain patents from
foreign governments, and it could not use the fact that foreign govern-
ments had granted such patents as a shield to U.S. antitrust law liability
if the procurement of the patents do not meet American standards.62
The logic of the analysis is compelling only as far as the act of state
doctrine is concerned. Why a foreign patent applicant should have to
meet American standards of conduct is a perplexing question that goes
to the merits of the dispute and not to the jurisdictional question.
Mannington's interpretation of the act of state doctrine is sup-
ported by several Supreme Court cases that indicate that receiving for-
eign approval of one's acts will not always shield one from antitrust
liability. In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. ,63 the defendants were
alleged to have secured a monopoly of interstate and foreign commerce
in sisal.' As part of the conspiracy to secure such a monopoly, it was
alleged that the governments of Mexico and Yucatan cooperated in the
defendant's efforts. Favorable laws, which were solicited by the de-
fendant and passed by the governments of Mexico and the Yucatan,
forced other buyers out of the market.65 Despite the foreign govern-
ment's involvement, the Court held that the plaintiffs claim was justici-
able in the American courts. The act of state doctrine presented no bar
to the adjudication of this suit.66 The Court distinguished American
Banana67 on the grounds that because at least part of the alleged con-
spiracy in Sisal Sales took place in the United States, American courts
had jurisdiction.68
60 Id.
61 It is a rare case, indeed, where a patent is thrust upon an individual.
62 This is true if the foreign patents are used to restrain U.S. foreign trade by blocking a
competitor's trade. In other words, the plaintiff still must show that defendant's actions affect U.S.
foreign commerce or, at least, are in U.S. foreign commerce.
63 274 U.S. 268 (1926).
64 "Sisal is the fiber of the henequen plant, a native of Mexico, and from it is fabricated...
the binder twine used for harvesting our grain crops." 274 U.S. at 272.
65 Id. at 273.
66 It should be noted that the act of state doctrine was not mentioned by name in the case.
67 See notes 52-55 and accompanying text supra.
68 The Court stated:
Here we have a contract, combination, and conspiracy entered into by parties within the
United States and made effective by acts done therein [and]. .. not merely of something
done by another government at the instigation of private parties. True, the conspirators were
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A foreign government's involvement in an alleged conspiracy also
did not bar adjudication in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp.69 The defendants had allegedly monopolized trade in
ferrovanadium and vanadium oxide,70 and the plaintiff complained
that as a result of the defendant's restraint of trade, it could not receive
enough of the metals to stay in business. Part of the plaintiff's business
problem stemmed from plaintiffs exclusion from the Canadian metals
market. Continental Ore, the plaintiff, alleged that Electro-Met of Ca-
nada, a wholly owned subsidiary of the defendant, Union Carbide, ex-
cluded the plaintiff from the Canadian market. The plaintiff alleged
that Electro-Met while ostensibly acting as the exclusive purchasing
agent for the Metals Controller of Canada, was actually acting under
Union Carbide's direction for the purpose of carrying out a conspiracy
to restrain and monopolize the vanadium industry.71 The Supreme
Court held that plaintiffs cause of action against Union Carbide was
not barred by the act of state doctrine despite the Canadian govern-
ment's apparent approval of Union Carbide's activities. Union Car-
bide's subsidiary argued that it was acting as an arm of the Canadian
government and hence its activities, including the exclusion of the
plaintiff from the market, could not be examined by an American
court. The Supreme Court rejected this contention by deciding that the
claim was justiciable as long as the plaintiffs "do not question the valid-
ity of any action taken by the Canadian Government or by its Metal
Controller.
72
The involvement of a foreign sovereign in the granting of patents
does not reach the level of placing the plaintiff's claims within the act of
state doctrine. The plaintiffs in Mannington heeded the warning given
in Continental Ore and avoided questioning the validity of any actions
taken by foreign sovereigns. Mannington carefully refrained from ask-
ing the American court to render the foreign patents invalid.73 Rather,
the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's procurement of foreign pat-
ents did not meet American standards of conduct and hence the patent
aided by discriminating legislation, but by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, they
brought about forbidden results within the United States.
274 U.S. at 276.
69 370 U.S. 690 (1961).
70 Vanadium oxide is converted into ferrovanadium which is used by steel companies as an
alloy in hardening steels.
71 370 U.S. at 703.
72 Id. at 706.
73 The court noted: "Mannington emphasizes that it is not challenging the right of a foreign
government to confer patents under its own requirements and indeed does not seek to have the
patents at issue adjudged invalid." 595 F.2d at 1290.
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holder should be barred from using the patents in order to monopolize
U.S. foreign trade.
The conclusion that the act of state doctrine does not bar jurisdic-
tion of the cause of action in Mannington may be confirmed in another
approach to the issue. Aside from the inquiry as to whether the grant-
ing of a patent has the traditional characteristics of a sovereign act that
falls within the act of state doctrine, another test may be used to decide
if such acts fall within the doctrine's purview. Since the act of state
doctrine results in an abstention by the American courts from inquiry-
ing into the validity of a foreign act, it is helpful to determine how the
American courts have treated such an act in other contexts. In terms of
foreign patent granting, American courts have not always treated that
act as sacrosanct. American court decisions affecting the use of foreign
patents are not uncommon.
Several cases illustrate that American courts are not always ad-
verse to ordering a party to restrict its use of a foreign patent. In United
States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,74 the defendants were involved
in alleged violations of the Sherman Act effected through agreements
involving exclusive licensing and exchange of patents between Ameri-
can and British companies. To prevent such violations, the district
court directed Imperial Chemicals (ICI), a British corporation, to grant
immunity under its patents.75 The court characterized its actions in the
following way:
[A]cting on the basis of our jurisdiction in personam, we are merely di-
recting ICI to refrain from asserting rights which it may have in Britain,
since the enforcement of those rights will serve to continue the effects of
wrongful acts it has committed within the United States affecting the for-
eign trade of the United States.
76
The British courts did not appreciate having the holder of a British
patent "forced" by U.S. courts to limit its use of the patent. As Sir
Raymond Evershed stated in the Court of Appeal:
[I]t seems to me, with all deference to the judgment of the district judge,
to be an assertion of an extra-territorial jurisdiction which we do not rec-
ognize for the American courts to make orders which would destroy or
qualify those statutory rights belonging to an English national who is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the American courts.77
This situation may be contrasted with the one in Mannington in which
an American national's use of its foreign patents is restricted. It may be
74 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
75 Expert testimony had been introduced expressing the opinion that "granting immunities is
contrary to British public policy." 105 F. Supp. at 229.
76 Id. at 228.
77 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 3 All. E.R. 88, 91 (Ch. 1954).
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more difficult for a foreign sovereign to complain when an American
national is ordered to do something by an American court. This would
seem to be especially true in situations such as the one in Mannington
where no claim is made that the defendant would be violating foreign
law if an American court ordered it nct to enforce its patents. The
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
notes "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law. . . attaching
legal consequences to conduct of a national of the state wherever the
conduct occurs .. ."78 Presumably this rule even applies to the extent
that an American court could call an American national's acts illegal
when even though the acts were legal in the country where they were
performed.
The United States Supreme Court has approved the curtailment of
a foreign patent holder's right in several other cases. In United States v.
NationalLead,79 the Supreme Court upheld a district court's injunction
restraining the defendants from attempting to enforce any rights under
any of its foreign patents. The injunction was granted to enjoin viola-
tions of the Sherman Act accomplished through the pooling of patents
and allocation of markets. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc.,80 the Supreme Court approved a district court injunction which
effectively enjoined enforcement of foreign patents against an Ameri-
can company. The injunction was granted to prevent antitrust viola-
tions.
Although it could be maintained that the issue that American
courts have sometimes enjoined the enforcement of foreign patents is a
"red herring,""1 the fact remains that in the past a foreign government's
imprimatur on a patent has not removed the patent activity from the
purview of the American courts. The fact that American courts have
enjoined the enforcement of foreign patents lends credence to the no-
tion that the granting of a patent is not the type of sovereign act that the
American courts will abstain from interference.
The analysis in this section leads to the conclusion that the Third
Circuit correctly rejected the act of state doctrine a jurisdictional bar to
Mannington's claim. This result raises the possibility that a court may
have to reach a decision on the merits of Mannington's unusual claim.
It is beyond the scope of this note to comment on how the court should
78 RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, at § 30(1)(a).
79 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
80 395 U.S. 100 (1968).
81 Brief for Appellee, at 16 n.15, Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1291
(3d Cir. 1979).
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deal substantively with the claim. Whether an American court should
decide that a holder of a foreign patent may not restrain U.S trade by
the use of that patent, if it were procured by standards unacceptable
under American law, is a difficult one. Such a decision would under-
mine the ability of foreign countries to set lower standards for the
granting of patents than those imposed by the United States. The very
fact that the act of state doctrine does not bar such a cause of action,
however, may point to inadequacies inherent in the doctrine. It is true
that Mannington's cause of action avoids questioning the validity of
any action taken by a foreign sovereign. Clearly, however, a foreign
sovereign's act, such as the granting of a patent, would be detrimentally
affected by a ruling in an American court granting the relief Manning-
ton seeks. As was noted above, foreign courts previously have ex-
pressed displeasure when an American court restricted the use of
foreign patents. Foreign reactions to a decision that would render
those patents a virtual nullity may be expected to be considerably har-
sher. This analysis indicates that the act of state doctrine may inade-
quately take into account foreign nations' interests in a given activity
when jurisdiction is extended beyond traditional territorial limitations.
The developing area of international comity as a part of antitrust sub-
ject matter jurisdiction determinations may help fill this gap.
THE DEVELOPING "COMITY ABSTENTION DOCTRINE"
The act of state doctrine was correctly rejected in Mannington.
But what the court gave to plaintiff with one hand, it may have taken
away with the other when the majority decided that the district court
may abstain from exercising its jurisdiction if principles of interna-
tional comity so require. According to Manningon, the abstention doc-
trine, which requires the weighing of comity factors 2 that militate
against exercising jurisdiction, was derived from Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of America. 3 Therefore, although the Mannington court
concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and
that the act of state doctrine did not bar adjudication of the claim, the
82 The term comity was defined in an early case as the "recognition which one nation allows
within its territory the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
The concept of comity as used in the Timberlane case is very broad. It includes consideration
of the potential for conflict with foreign law or policy if the American court decides to exercise
jurisdiction. The Timberlane case isolated several factors that should be included in the comity
consideration. See note 35 supra.
83 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
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case was remanded to the district court to "allow an evaluation of the
factors counselling for or against the exercise of jurisdiction.
8 4
Timberlane, in a section of the opinion entitled "Extraterritorial
Reach of the United States Antitrust Law," 5 concluded that the effects
test by which the American courts have traditionally determined extra-
territorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act was unsatisfactory be-
cause it ignores the interests of foreign nations.86 The Timberlane court
proposed the idea that the effects on American commerce should be
weighed against the interests of other nations in the challenged activity
stating:
A tripartite analysis seems to be indicated. . . . [The antitrust laws re-
quire in the first instance that there be some effect-actual or intended-
on American foreign commerce before the federal courts may legitimately
exercise subject matter jurisdiction under those statutes. Second, a
greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate
that the effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the
plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws. . . . Third,
there" is the additional question which is unique to the international set-
ting of whether the interests of, and links to, the United States-including
the magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce-are suffi-
ciently strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of
extraterritorial authority.87
Mannington separated the first two parts of this analysis from the third.
The first two were used to determine subject matter jurisdiction and the
third was reserved for ascertaining whether abstention was appropriate.
This analysis may be slightly different than what was proposed in
imberlane for it is not entirely clear that Timberlane mandated such a
separation. It is suggested here that a better approach would be to
combine all three parts of the analysis at the outset to determine
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. This approach would create
a sliding scale of effects. Such a sliding scale would allow considera-
tion of the other nations' interests without foregoing the exercise of ju-
risdiction if the effects on American commerce are substantial enough
to outweigh these interests. The greater the importance of other na-
tions' interest, the greater the magnitude of effects that have to be
shown before the American court has subject matter jurisdiction. Sub-
stantial foreign interests may be outweighed, however, if a great
enough effect on American commerce is evidenced. The single test ap-
proach has the advantage to bringing to the fore the problem of comity.
84 595 F.2d at 1298.
85 549 F.2d at 608.
86 Id. at 611-12.
87 Id. at 613.
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It has the same disadvantage as the Manninglon approach, however, in
that it still may lead to much uncertainty as to how a court will judge
the importance of activities to other nations vis-a-vis the interests of the
United States in their effects upon American foreign commerce.
Timberlane, itself, is not clear about the question whether the tri-
partite analysis is to be one test for subject matter jurisdiction. Acting
Assistant Attorney General Shenefield stated that "Timberlane is not
an extension of the effects doctrine. . . . [Judge Choy in Timberlane]
thus held that where considerations of comity do not weigh heavily in
favor of applying U.S. law, our courts, as a matter of law, not merely as
a matter of discretion, lack subject matter jurisdiction."88 The Man-
nington court, however, split the comity question from the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction inquiry.
The comity inquiry and balancing test, although difficult for a
court to administer, is a logical complement to the underlying rationale
for the act of state doctrine expressed in Sabbatino. If the basis of the
act of state doctrine is to preserve the separation of powers and insure
that the judiciary does not interfere with the executive in the conduct of
foreign relations, it seem fair to say that this principle should be carried
over to situations where a traditional "act of state" is not involved and
yet the potential for interference with foreign relations is great. Such is
the case with the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws;
thus, the idea of bringing comity considerations into the question seems
well justified. The concurrance in Mannington expressed this when it
stated: "[I]t seems that. . . [comity] considerations are properly to be
weighed at the outset when the court determines whether jurisdictional
vel non exists, or in fashioning the decree."89
The Manning/on court remanded the case for a consideration of
the comity factors although some of them may be readily applied. The
American nationality of both the plaintiff and the defendant, and the
consequent ease of making a court order effective, are factors which
would lower the level of effects required before jurisdiction could be
asserted. There is no indication that the defendant would be violating
foreign law if it was ultimately ordered not to enforce its foreign pat-
ents. This factor would also set up a low effects barrier to jurisdiction.
The most important factors are those which also happen to be the most
88 Remarks of John H. Shenefield, Acting Ass't Attorney General, before A.B.A. Section of
Int'l Law 17-18 (Aug. 9, 1978), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,386 (1978). For the
view that Timberlane did split the comity inquiry from the subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry, see
46 FORDHAM L. REv. 354 (1977).
89 595 F.2d at 1299.
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difficult ones to judge. Determining the degree of conflict with foreign
law or policy, if jurisdiction is exercised, requires the court to analyze
the patent system of foreign countries in order to determine the impor-
tance of those systems to each foreign sovereign. This involved exami-
nation may lead to different results. Some countries may indeed
consider patent granting as no more than a bookkeeping function while
others may consider it a crucial function. The danger of interfering
with U.S. relations with these countries, by exercising jurisdiction over
a cause of action that may indirectly render these patents unenforce-
able, is greatly different between these countries. The court's obligation
to consider comity in deciding whether jurisdiction exists is by no
means a frivolous one. Furthermore, the complexity of the problem is
also not to be considered lightly and a multifarious test may have to be
the answer.
A recent case in the United States District Court of the Southern
District of New York continues the trend towards the consideration
international comity as a factor in determining whether subject matter
jurisdiction over an antitrust suit should be exercised if it exists. In
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf and Western Industries, Inc. ,90 the
plaintiff brought an antitrust cause of action against the defendant,
Gulf and Western, for allegedly interfering with the plaintiffs efforts to
develop tourist facilities in the Dominican Republic.9 1 Part of the ac-
tivities complained of by the plaintiff involved the Dominican govern-
ment. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had convinced local
officials to prohibit charter flights from landing at the airport if the
flights were transporting guests to the plaintiffs facilities. Also, the de-
fendant allegedly delayed construction and altered the route of a road-
way being built by the government to the disadvantage of plaintiffs
business.9 2
The district court decided that the record in the case was inade-
quate to make a reasoned decision on the "ten factors relevant to the
issue of jurisdiction."9 The court noted that the proper standard for
determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is "a balancing
test that weighs the impact of the foreign conduct on United States
commerce against the potential international repercussions of asserting
jurisdiction."94 Without deciding which method it would use, the court
90 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
91 The defendant owned and operated already existing tourist facilities in the Dominican Re-
public.
92 473 F. Supp. at 685.
93 Id. at 688. See note 35 supra.
94 473 F. Supp. at 687.
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noted the different approaches advocated by the majority and concur-
ring opinion in Mannington.5 Although the concurring opinion
wanted to use the balancing analysis at the outset to determine whether
subject matter jurisdiction exists, the majority in Mannington decided
that the effects test should be first used to determine if jurisdiction ex-
ists and then apply the "foreign relations impact factors" to determine
if abstention is appropriate.
9 6
While leaving unresolved the question of which approach it would
advocate, DominicusAmericana Bohio did add an additional link to the
formation of the comity question analysis in antitrust subject matter
jurisdiction determinations. The district court explicitly placed the
burden upon the defendants to show that jurisdiction should not be
exercised in a given case. The court stated that "the defendants must
bear the burden of demonstrating that foreign policy considerations
outweigh the need to enforce the antitrust laws where the foreign com-
merce of the United States is affected."97
The next step in the development of the comity doctrine will be the
most interesting and significant one. To date, no antitrust cause of ac-
tion involving American foreign commerce has been rejected by the
federal courts on the basis of comity considerations. Once such a deci-
sion is made, if ever, the scale for the balancing test will become cali-
brated and a better idea of what constitutes the somewhat vague
"foreign relations impact factors" will become known. Until the time
as such a decision is rendered, the probability of a court abstaining
from jurisdiction based on such factors remains difficult to calculate.
CONCLUSION
Concern for other nations' interests and United States relations
with these nations must be considered whenever American courts ex-
traterritorially apply U.S. laws. The act of state doctrine has been de-
veloped to deal with such concerns, but it may not always go far
enough in its consideration of those interests.
Seemingly opposite trends have developed in the courts regarding
this idea. On the one hand, the act of state doctrine has been narrowed
by some circuits, thereby allowing the adjudication of more cases. On
95 See text accompanying notes 16-40 supra.
96 473 F. Supp. at 688.
97 Id. Placing such a burden on the defendant is unusual because the subject-matter jurisdic-
tion inquiry goes to the court's interests and not necessarily to the parties' interest. The court
should ask the parties to address the issue of whether either party initially had broached the
jurisdiction question. Under the test proposed in this note, if comity issues, when objectively
considered, point to no jurisdiction, the court has no subject-matter jurisdiction.
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the other hand, the notion of comity is said to permit abstention in
cases in which no act of state is involved. The Mannington opinion
reflects this conflict. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit finds
the act of state doctrine inapplicable to foreign grants of patents but
admonishes the district court to not exercise jurisdiction if principles of
comity so warrant. The granting of a patent may not fall within the act
of state doctrine but that activity nonetheless may be quite important to
the issuing country. It is suggested in this note that the comity question
should be placed in the subject matter jurisdiction equation to balance
American interests in the free flow of U.S. foreign commerce against
other nations' interests and possible interference with the conduct of
U.S. foreign relations. This approach may compensate for some inade-
quacies of the act of state doctrine in cases such as Mannington that do
not fall within the traditional act of state doctrine and yet contain po-
tential for interference with significant foreign interests or U S. foreign
relations. The comity factor may bar jurisdiction in such cases. This
approach may also represent a refinement of the effects test tradition-
ally used since the Alcoa case. No pre-determined degree of effects on
American foreign commerce can -be fixed before subject matter juris-
diction is said to be present. Rather, the level of effects required for
such jurisdiction depends on the other side of the balance-the impor-
tance of foreign interests in the activity and possible interference with
foreign relations if jurisdiction is exercised.
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